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The state must not infringe on citizens’ sexual freedom


Sex work between consenting adults should be recognised and regulated like any other profession, with the state fighting coercion and exploitation rather than imposing a sexual morality.
Author: Daniel BorrilloPublished: November 10, 2026
The state must not infringe on citizens’ sexual freedom

We are free to choose our profession, start a business, sell our property, defend controversial opinions or practise a religion. Yet this sovereignty over our own actions collapses as soon as sexuality comes into play. At the international and European levels, sexual freedom is not recognised as a fundamental right in its own right, but enjoys only indirect protection through respect for private life, personal autonomy and physical integrity [1].

As soon as sex is paid for, it becomes a moral, social and criminal problem. Sex may be a matter of leisure, intimacy or pleasure, but it becomes suspect when it is an economic activity.

Consent does not need moral approval

An adult must be free to make their own choices about sexuality. Yet where prostitution is concerned, individual will tends to be set aside in the name of relations of domination, economic constraints or moral considerations. Certain practices are often banned in the name of human dignity, on the grounds that they harm the person. While this stance is meant to protect individuals from violence and exploitation, it becomes problematic when it serves to justify restrictions on consenting adults. Can a judge, a political majority or certain feminist currents define the boundaries of dignity? [2]

Swingers’ parties, the creation of pornographic content on platforms such as OnlyFans and paid sexual services may all attract disapproval. But disapproval alone cannot justify banning them. It is not the state’s role to impose an official conception of good sexuality. Protecting individuals from abuse and coercion cannot mean protecting them from decisions they are free to make.

Why should paid sex be exempt from ordinary employment law?

We offer services and provide our time, skills and physical strength without giving up our rights. Yet when the activity is sexual, it becomes difficult for some to see the person carrying it out as a worker, able to negotiate their working conditions and set their own limits.

The problem lies in the confusion between forced prostitution and freely chosen prostitution. Human trafficking and exploitation must be firmly combated, but it cannot be presumed that everyone working in prostitution is necessarily a victim.

We abolished slavery, not agriculture. We fought sweatshops, not the textile industry. Why should prostitution be the only activity whose abuses justify condemning an entire sector? Protecting people means guaranteeing them rights, legal and economic remedies, and the means to defend their autonomy and interests.

This is the path Belgium took in 2024, when it adopted a law allowing sex workers to work under a specific employment contract. The Netherlands, Germany and Austria have also chosen to regulate the activity. As early as 2001, the Court of Justice of the European Union recognised that self-employed sex work could constitute an economic activity protected by EU law [3].

Penalising clients does not protect prostitutes

France has taken a different approach. Under the law of April 13th 2016, it made paying for sex a criminal offence, in the name of fighting sexual exploitation and reducing demand. This choice by the legislature nevertheless raises questions about its actual effects on the living and working conditions of the people concerned [4]. As early as December 2019, an inter-ministerial evaluation reported that prostitutes’ precarity had worsened [5]. Médecins du Monde also found that sex workers’ health had deteriorated, as they faced greater difficulty in negotiating condom use and accessing prevention services. These problems were compounded by growing isolation, longer working hours and lower incomes [6].

Can we really claim to protect people while weakening their working conditions and their ability to defend their interests with clients?

Beyond the debate on prostitution lies the question of personal autonomy. Recognised by the European Court of Human Rights, notably in Pretty v. the United Kingdom of April 29th 2002, this principle informs reflection on the freedom of consenting adults to choose sex work and define how they carry it out, without making it a right.

Moreover, the 2016 law penalising clients rests on a paternalistic logic that claims to protect prostitutes from their own decisions [7]. The product of an alliance between abolitionists of the right and the left, it illustrates the ideological tensions running through this debate, as the sociologist Lilian Mathieu points out [8]. A contradiction then emerges: how can one defend women’s emancipation while denying some of them the ability to determine the conditions of their work? Prostitution, like any profession, may be freely chosen or endured. The real dividing line is not between paid and unpaid sex, but between freedom and coercion.

This approach, however, runs up against a different conception of prostitution, held by most feminist currents, which see it above all as a symptom of structural domination [9]. While this analysis sheds light on very real power relations and inequalities, it cannot justify systematically denying the people concerned the ability to make their own choices.

For the legal normalisation of sexuality

Moral control has not disappeared. It is now also expressed through the notions of dignity, domination and coercive control. It is time to ask a simple question: why should sexuality be a permanent exception to ordinary law?

Normalising sexuality in law does not mean trivialising violence or denying exploitation. It means applying the same rules as to other human activities [10]. Individuals must be able to organise their intimate lives, choose their partners, define their practices and even offer paid sexual services. The question is not so much whether prostitution is morally desirable as why an activity carried out by consenting adults could not be recognised as work and, as such, benefit from an appropriate legal framework [11].

A free society cannot make the recognition of rights conditional on moral approval of individual behaviour. Accepting sex work as a professional activity does not mean praising it, but respecting the freedom of those who practise it [12]. It is not the state’s role to dictate what people may do with their bodies; it must confine itself to guaranteeing everyone the freedom to dispose of them.

Daniel Borrillo is a lawyer, a researcher at CERSA (CNRS – Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas) and an associate expert at GenerationLibre.

  1. D. Borrillo and D. Lochak, La liberté sexuelle, PUF, Paris, 2005. ↩
  2. S. Hennette-Vauchez, ‘A human dignitas? Remnants of the ancient legal concept in contemporary dignity jurisprudence’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 9, no. 1, January 2011. ↩
  3. Court of Justice of the European Communities, November 20th 2001, Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECR p. I-08615. ↩
  4. D. Borrillo, ‘La lutte contre le système prostitutionnel est de nature à fragiliser la vie de celles et ceux qu’elle entend protéger’, Le Monde, October 21st 2022. ↩
  5. GAS, IGA and IGJ, Évaluation de la loi du 13 avril 2016 visant à renforcer la lutte contre le système prostitutionnel et à accompagner les personnes prostituées, report no. 19034R, December 2019, published June 22nd 2020. ↩
  6. T. Gaudy and H. Le Bail (CNRS), Synthèse comparative des rapports d’évaluation de la loi française sur la prostitution de 2016, December 2020. ↩
  7. In its judgment of July 25th 2024, M.A. and Others v. France, the Court found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. While acknowledging the risks faced by prostitutes, it held that France enjoys a ‘wide margin of appreciation’ to maintain its model. ↩
  8. L. Mathieu, La Fin du tapin. Sociologie de la croisade pour l’abolition de la prostitution, Lormont, François Bourin, 2014. ↩
  9. K. Barry, ‘La prostitution est un crime’, Déviance et Société, vol. 10, no. 3, 1986; G. Duché, ‘Prostitution, de la misogynie à la haine de soi’, Le Coq-Héron, no. 232, 2018; C. Legardinier, ‘Dossier : « Ni un travail ni du sexe », la prostitution est une violence’, Prostitution et Société, 2022. ↩
  10. D. Borrillo, ‘La professionnalisation de la prostitution’, in R. Dalmasso and C. Ménabé (eds), Le travail du sexe et le droit, Mare&Martin, 2026. ↩
  11. As called for by the European Sex Workers’ Rights Alliance since 2002. ↩
  12. GenerationLibre, Faire entrer le travail sexuel dans le droit commun. Pour une reconnaissance et une protection du travail sexuel, June 2023. ↩
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Last edited: November 10, 2026
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